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The Conservative Party’s divisions over the EU are well known. But
what motivated MPs to back Leave or Remain? Luke Moore uses
logistic regression analysis to consider three key motivations: seeking
office, votes, or that particular policy. He explains why all three affected
Conservative MPs’ decision making, but that policy- or office-seeking
were more prominent.
The divisions amongst Conservative MPs over Europe has been one of the most
significant issues in modern British politics. Indeed, part of the reason why David
Cameron called the referendum was to manage backbench dissent on Europe. The
referendum campaign exposed deep divisions within the party with a majority of MPs
backing remain but with a significant minority (41%) backing leave (see table 1).
Sources: MPs’ personal websites, BBC News, and TheyWorkForYou.com
But what motivated their positions? MPs’ motivations are considered in terms of the
policy, office, and votes trichotomy (Müller and Strøm 1999). This approach suggests that
their positions can be explained by three objectives: MPs backed one side because they
believed in the cause (policy-seeking); they backed a campaign in the hope of gaining
promotion (office-seeking); or they based their positon on their electoral interests (vote-
seeking).
Logistic regression analysis was used in order to test for the potential importance of
these three motivations. Below I overview the results.
Policy-seeking
If Conservative MPs were policy-seeking it would be expected that ideology would be
highly important in predicting referendum positions. Besides Europe, the other main
ideological divide in the Conservatives in recent years has been the social/moral policy
dimension which separates social liberals from social conservatives. Social conservatives
hold more restrictive positions on issues such as abortion and gay rights, whilst
advocating tougher punishment for criminals. Social liberals, by contrast, take a more
permissive stance on social issues.
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It was expected that social conservatives would be more likely to back leave. Previous
studies of MPs and also voting behaviour in the referendum suggest that social
conservatism is associated with Euroscepticism. The reason for this correlation cannot
be established with any certainty. One plausible explanation is that positions on Europe
could be related to the GAL (green/alternative/libertarian) versus TAN
(tradition/authoritarian/nationalist) dimension of political contestation (Hooghe et al.,
2002). Parties or politicians with TAN orientations often combine a strong defence of the
national community with support for traditional values. On this basis it could be that a
correlation between social conservatism and Euroscepticism signifies the importance of
nationalism and a desire to protect British sovereignty.
To measure social conservatism I developed a variable which took account of MPs’
positions on five issues which resulted in a variable ranging from 1 to 10 with higher
values denoting greater social conservatism. Figure 1 shows the spread of opinion on
social conservatism amongst Tory MPs.
Higher values denote greater social conservatism. Social conservatism scores for each
MP based on their positions on five issues: abortion, gay marriage, death penalty, use of
three parent embryos and greater use of imprisonment as opposed to community
sentences. For each issue, an MP was given 2 for a socially conservative stance, 0 for a
socially liberal stance or 1 where there was insufficient data.
The results suggest that there was indeed a strong and statistically significant
relationship between social conservatism and Euroscepticism. Figure 2 below plots this
relationship.
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Office-seeking
Whilst the referendum campaign was formally unwhipped, meaning that ministers were
not automatically dismissed for endorsing leave, the leadership made it clear that it
would rather MPs supported remain. This gave MPs with ministerial ambitions an
incentive to support remain.
It was predicted that MPs’ referendum endorsements would differ according to office-
status. Frontbenchers had the most incentive to back remain as most of them would
have wanted to either keep their jobs or gain promotion. Experienced backbenchers (who
first entered Parliament prior to the 2015 general election) had the least incentive to
support remain.
This group consists of MPs who had been in the Commons long enough to have been
offered a government job but had either been rejected by Cameron, either through
sacking or being overlooked, or had chosen not pursue a ministerial career, therefore this
group had a lower expectation of being offered a position by Cameron post-referendum.
MPs first elected in 2015 were expected to be in the middle of these two groups. The
2015 intake were too junior to have been offered a frontbench position. This group
included many who were seeking promotion but also some who would have been less
inclined to pursue office.
These differences were reinforced by the fact that a leave victory was likely to cause a
Prime Ministerial resignation. Frontbench MPs owed their positions to Cameron and a
new leader could threaten their jobs. By contrast, the experienced backbenchers had
been rejected by Cameron and stood to potentially gain from a new leader. Indeed, the
referendum did result in a new leader with Theresa May dismissing long serving
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ministers from the Cameron premiership, such as George Osborne and Nicky Morgan,
whilst  appointing MPs who had been out of office for a long time, such as David Davis
and Liam Fox.
The results were in line with these expectations. Figure 3 below shows referendum
support by office-status. The only group with a majority (61%) supporting leave was the
experienced backbenchers. Over three-quarters (76%) of frontbenchers supported
remain. The new intake of MPs was in the middle of these two groups but slightly closer
to the frontbenchers with 62% of MPs supporting remain.
Vote-seeking
It was predicted that the desire for re-election would mean that there would be a
correlation between constituency Euroscepticism and the likelihood of supporting leave
and that this would have the greatest effect on MPs from marginal constituencies. In
order to measure constituency Euroscepticism, data from Hanretty et al was used.
The results suggest that there was a correlation between constituency Euroscepticism
and endorsing leave. An experienced backbencher representing a highly Eurosceptic
seat had a 72% chance of backing leave compared to only 38% for a similar MP from a
highly pro-EU constituency. There is, then, evidence to suggest that vote-seeking did
affect MPs’ referendum positions.
However, there are two caveats to this finding. The first is that there is no evidence that
MPs from marginal constituencies were more sensitive to constituency opinion. The
second is that the effect of the constituency Euroscepticism variable is weaker than the
effect of either office-status or social conservatism. This means that an MP’s ideology or
office status was a better predictor of their stance than constituency opinion. For example
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a socially conservative MP representing a pro-EU constituency is predicted to be more
likely to support leave.
There were some unique factors in the Brexit debate which may have suppressed
importance of vote-seeking. Firstly, as the result was determined by referendum, rather
than by Parliament, MPs may have reasoned that constituents would not hold them
responsible. Secondly, only 21% of MPs represented seats in which more than 60% of
voters were estimated to vote the same way in the referendum, meaning that for most
MPs, whichever side they backed, they would be opposing at least 40% of their
constituents.
Conclusion
Policy, office, and vote seeking intentions all seem to have influenced the positions of
Conservative MPs in the Brexit referendum. However vote-seeking intentions were less
important than either policy or office-seeking.  The conclusion that policy and office-
seeking mattered more than vote-seeking suggests that the internal politics of
Conservative Party had a greater effect on MPs’ referendum positions than the wider
electorate.
_____
Note: the above draws on the author’s article published in Parliamentary Affairs.
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